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dishonesty the falsehood of the testimony is detected and deceives
none.
,Absolutely to exclude an interested witness is, therefore, as
unsound in theory as it is inconsistent in practice. It is inconsistent, because the law admits witnesses far more likely to be
biassed in favor of the party than he who has merely a pecuniary
interest. A father may testify for his son; a child living with
his father, and dependent upon his bounty, may appear as his
witness, nay, as his only witness, without question. Is the immediate gain of a dollar, by the result of a cause, so potent to outweigh integrity, while affection, consanguinity, dependence, are
put down as dust in the balance ? There is not another rule in
the law of evidence so prolific of disputes, uncertainties, and
delays, as that we are considering. Not a circuit is held, but
question after question is raised upon it; nor a term where
exceptions growing out of it are not debated. Some of the fore-,
going reasons apply also to the exclusion of a person sentenced
for felony. It is wiser, we cannot doubt, to place the witness on
the stand and let the jury judge of his testimony." 1 Phil.
Evid. pp. 25-26, note.
J. A. J.
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JAMES B. THAYER, ADMINISTRATOR, VS. W. W. WELLINGTON et al.
A will duly attested, giving a certain sum of money to T. and W. in trust, "to
appropriate the same in such manner as I may, by any instrument in writing,
under my hand, direct and appoint," and an appointment by a separate paper,
signed by the testator, but not duly attested, declaring the appropriation and
naming the beneficiary, does not create a valid bequest in favor of the person
thus declared and appointed by the unattested instrument.

This case was heard before the full court, upon bill, answers,
and evidence. The facts will sufficiently appear in the opinion
delivered by the court.
B. B. Curtis and 0. T. Russell, for the city of Cambridge.
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A. H. Fiske and IT

. Parker, for residuary devisees.

J.B. Thayer, pro se.
D EY, J.-The present bill is filed by the administrator with.
the will annexed, of the estate of the late Edmund T. Dana, who
asks the direction of this Court as to his duty in the execution
of his trust as to the payment of any money in discharge of a
certain provision in the last will and testament of said Dana,
being clause No. 23, and is in the words following: - I give to
Edmund T. Hastings and to William W. Wellington, and to the
survivor of them, fifteen thousand dollars in trust, to appropriate
the same in such manner as I may by any instrument in writing
under my hand direct and appoint."
The testator, by a separate instrument bearing on its face the
same date as the will, but not attested by any witness, or shown
to have been executed in the presence of any, or to have been
signed on the same day except as by the date written thereon,
did direct and appoint as follows:"To Edmund T. Hastings and William W. Wellington, or wohosoever else-may
execute ti e trust created by the twenty-third clause of my Wll.
"The sum of fifteen thousand dollars, bequeathed by the said twenty-third
clause, is to be paid over, if and whenever my trustees or trustee shall deem
it expedient to do so, to the City of Cambridge, to be held by the said city in
trust, as an entire fund, the income thereof to be appropriated annually, for
ever, to the increase and support of the library of the Cambridge Athenmum; provided, however, that, if and whenever my said trustees or trustee
shall be of opinion that it is not expedient that the said sum of fifteen thousand dollars should be so appropriated, the same to be paid over to my heirs
at law; and provided, further, that the said capital sum be paid over, either
to said City of Cambridge or to my heirs at law, within three years from my
decease.
"EDM. T. DANA.

"Cambridge, March 10, 1858."

This paper it is alleged was placed by said Dana in the hands
of said Edmund T. Hastings, but at what time does not appear.'
'The trustees have in writing signified their intention to pay said
sum to the City of Cambridge. On the part of the residuary
legatees, it is contended that by 23d clause in the will, nothing
passed to.the City of Cambridge, the same not being named as
legatee, and it not being competent for a testator by a duly executed will, to create for himself a power to dispose of his estate
to legatees by another instrument not duly executed as a will or
codicil.
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The power of transmission of property by will is a power
solely to be executed under our statute law. The legislative
authority has seen fit to regulate the exercise of this power by
precise and clear provisions. By those provisions, as found in
Rev. Stat. oh. 62, § 6, and Gen. Stat. ch. 90, § 6, it is declared
,that no will (except nuncupative wills) shall be effectual to pass
any estate real or personal, nor to change or in any way to affect
the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by some person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed in the presence of the testator by
three or more competent witnesses."
These provisions are
express in their terms and prescribe a rule from which this Court
cannot depart, although its -application in particular cases may
defeat the giving effect to the actual purpose of a party as to the
disposition of his property. The practical benefits of such provision have been fully acknowledged by the long continuance of
statutes requiring them as to devises of real estate, and the general extension of them at a late period to wills devising personal
I
estate.
A similar view of this subject prevails in England, where, by
the stat. 1 Viet. ch. 26, designed and effectually framed to make
the provisions regarding a certain number of witnesses to a will,
to be in effect one that should actually embrace all cases of
bequests claimed under a will, and exclude all reservation of
power on the part of the testator to extend the provigions of a
will by an instrument not executed as required by the Statute of
Wills.
It is true that the provisions of that statute are somewhat
broader than those of Massachusetts, and it is by the latter that
the present case is to be adjudicated. But we think that under
a similar statute to that which has existed here since Rev. Stat.
c. 62, § 6 (1886), requiring an attestation, by three -witnesses, of
the execution of wills of personal estate and real estate, the English courts would hot have sustained a provision in a will that
the particular beneficiary may be declared by the testator in a
subsequent and independent instrument not executed in the form
prescribed by said statute. While the law permitted legacies of
personal property to be given without any attestation of witnesses, and by loose and informal papers, the courts were disposed to give effect to a bequest of personal property by an
instrument not duly attested as a will, notwithstanding the exist-
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ence of a will previously made and executed in conformity to the
statute. Butunder the statute requiring a similar form of attestation by three witnesses, in cases of personal bequests as well
as devises of real estate, no case has occurred in which we have
sanctioned any departure from the requirement that all bequests
must be made by a will duly attested by witnesses.
The statute of 1 Vict. ch. 26 has put an end in England to
all further attempts by a testator to create, by an attested will, a
power to charge by a separate instrument not duly attested, legacies upon his estate. 1 Jarman on Wills 147. As already
remarked, it will be found that prior to that statute it had been
held that where, by a will duly attested, the testator had charged
his lands with the payment of debts and legacies, that is, where
a devise of land was made to devisees subject to payment of legacies, a personal bequest given by instrument not duly attested
according to the statute, was a valid legacy, and chargeable upon
the estate. In view of this state of the law, it was urged that,
under this course of decisions, it would follow that a person
might, by means of a will duly executed, secure to himself, by
a provision in such will, the power to make a further disposition
of his lands by a written instrument not duly attested as a will,
declaring the devisees. To this it was answered, "if a man
might, by a will duly attested, devise his lands upon such trust
as he should appoint by any other instrument, it would in effect
amount to a repeal of the statute in respect to the solemnities
of testamentary disposition of lands. A man would have nothing
to do on his coming of age but to devise his whole real estate to
some nominal person upon such trust as the testator should in
writing hereafter appoint, and thus he might at any time thereafter make a testamentary disposition of his estate without conformity to the ceremonies required by the statute." Fearne's
Opinion 425; 6 Cruise Dig. 66, Greenlf. Ed.
The view thus stated, denying that any authority could be
reserved by the testator to declare and create new devisees by an
unattested instrument when the devise was one within the statute, was sustained by H17abergham vs. Vincent, 5 T. R. 92, and
the same case in 2 Vesey Jr. 204, and in Rose vs. Cuny]ngame,
12 Vesey 29; John8on vs. Ball, 5 De Gex & S. 85.
In Washburn on Real Property, 2 Vol. 693, the rule upon
this subject is stated to be that a testator cannot by his will
reserve a power to dispose of an estate at a future time by an
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instrument not executed as required by the Statute of Wills, so
as to take effect under his will. The doctrine of the New York
courts is to the like effect. In Langden vs. Aster, 8 Duer 477,
it was said by DuER, J., "ca testator cannot by his will confer
on himself, prospectively, the power of altering or revoking, by
an unattested will, any of the provisions in his will." The ruling
was equally strong as held by the Court of Appeals in the same
case. 16 New York Reports 22. In-Thompson vs. Quinby, 2
Bradford, 1 New York Surrogate Cases, it was held, " that a
will cannot reserve a power to give by an instrument not executed
as a will."
We find no authority in any decisions of this court for sustaining a bequest made under such reserved power of future
declaration by the testator, as to the nature of the legacy, and
the person for whose benefit it is given, and we cannot but feel
that the holding a devise or bequest thus created to be a legal
devise, would be in direct contradiction, both to the letter of the
statute and the purposes intended to be secured by its enactment.
Unless we refuse to sanction a bequest of this character, the
statute becomes a dead letter as to all who choose to disregard
it, and legacies may be given to the whole amount of the estate
without any indication on the face of the will who are the legatees, or what amount individual persons are to receive, or whether the estate is'given to those who are allied to the testator by
blood, or to strangers, or devoted to some public charity. It
would only be necessary to make a mere naked devise to some
individual duly attested by three witnesses, "cto hold the same
wholly in trust for such persons as the testator may hereafter
direct and appoint," and then by an instrument not executed in
the presence of witnesses, the testatoi may create his legatees as
his future purposes might suggest.
The language of this court in Tucker vs. Seamen's Aid Society,
7 Met. 204, was, "cthe law requires a will to be executed in the
presence of three witnesses, and with other solemnities calculated
to insure correctness, and guard against mistake and imposition,
and without this precaution every act and instrument purporting
to give property, real or personal, by will, is inoperative and
void."
We are constrained by the statute, and by the course of judicial decisions upon statutes of like character, from giving effect
to a legacy declared and given to a legatee by an instrument not
duly attested as a testamentary disposition of property. The
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result is, therefore, that the instrument signed by Edmund T.
Dana, declaring that the sum of $15,000 bequeathed by 28d
clause of his will, is to be paid over, if and whenever his trustees
shall deem it expedient to do so, to the City of Cambridge, to
be held by the same city on certain trusts stated, does not operate
to create a valid devise in favor of the City of Cambridge, and
cannot be enforced as such.
The view thus taken of the present case does not exclude in
all cases a reference to other documents or instruments for the
purpose of giving effect to a will. A testator may refer expressly
to a paper already executed, and described with such particularity, as to incorporate it virtually in the will, as he may refer
to deeds and other instruments, or monuments or existing facts,
to which reference may be had, in construing his will. ffabergham vs. Vincent, 2 Vesey 220; Smart vs. Priejan, 6 Vesey 560 ;
TVilbar vs. Smith, 6 Allen 194; Loring vs. Sumner, 23 Pick.
98; Longstaff vs. .Rennisor, 1 Drew. 28; Tonnele vs. Hall, 4
Comst. 140.
The distinction is a very obvious one. In the case last stated,
the purpose of the testator as to this particular legatee, and the
character of the legacy, is fully settled. Such reference leaves
nothing ambulatory, and excludes the idea of an unsettled purpose, and a design to leave anything open as to the person who
shall be the legatee.. But if his purpose is not definitely settled
at the time of executing his will, but is to be fashioned and
moulded by future etents that may affect his mind, such future
determination to make one a legatee cannot be allowed to have
any legal effect, uniless by the execution of a codicil or a subsequent will executed in accordance with the legal'requirements of
a testamentary instrument.
It is further urged that although the instrument signed by Mr.
Dana, directing the appropriation and naming the City of Cambridge as the beneficiary, is defective as a will or codicil, by reason of its not being duly attested, yet this court may sustain
the intended legacy, it being given to a charitable use and to be
dealt with as a public charity.
No doubt a court of equity will deal liberally with a public
charity. It will do so in supplying the want of a proper trustee,
and in aiding the defective execution of a power of appointment
and the uncertainty arising from the generality of the description
of the beneficiaries. But the difficulty in the present case is
that no public charity is established or shown to exist under the
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will of Mr. Dana. You have nothing whereon to raise the slightest presumption of a public charity. The clause in the will
declared a mere naked trust of a sum of money which the testator reserved the right to appropriate in such a manner as he
might subsequently direct and appoint. It was as competent,
under this provision, to have appropriated it to any one of his
kindred as to the City of Cambridge. It is only by recurring
to the instrument not duly attested that you find any allusion to
a public charity, -or that the City of Cambridge was to be a beneficiary. The difficulty here lies tob deep to be removed even by
a court of equity. It is the absence of any legal instrument
creating a public charity, and not a defective execution of a
power of appointment that has been legally authorized by a will.
Nor can we adopt the suggestion made in behalf of the City of
Cambridge, that effect may be given to the supposed purposes of
this charity by holding this bequest to be an absolute one by the
testator of a sum of money to Hastings and Wellington personally, in the confidence that they would appropriate it as he should
thereafter direct. As an absolute legacy to the persons named,
to be disposed of as they might elect, or appropriate it as in
their judgments might be most useful, the words of this clause
do not authorize that effect to be given to it. The fifteen thousand dollars were given to them in trust, " to appropriate the
same in such manner as I may by any instrument in writing
under my hand direct and appoint." It was not the intention
of the testator under that clause in the will, to make any present
appropriation of the sum named therein or to clothe the trustees
with power to do so.
In the opinion of the court, the 23d clause in this will, with
the unattested instrument signed by said Dana, declaring the
appropriation of the said sum of fifteen thousand dollars to the
City of Cambridge, and the assent of said Hastings and Wellington to the payment of the same, do not create a valid bequest to
the City of Cambridge.
By the courtesy of Mr. Justice DxwEy, we have been enabled to give to
the profession the foregoing very able
and satisfactory opinion of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts at an

that we should not be expected to add
anything upon the leading point decided in the case. We have discussed
the subject at length in Redfield on
Wills 271, 279, where numerous cases

earlier day than it would otherwise be.

bearing upon the point are referred to.

come accessible to them. The grounds
No inference should be made from
upon which the case rests are so en- any incidental statements n the above
tirely unquestionable, and are sa uni- opinion against the general validity of
versally recognised at the present day, testamentary powers, whereby the will
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may be so expressed as not to disclose
either the persons to be benefited, or
the proportions in which the ultimate
donees are to take. Nothing is more
unquestionable than the right of the
testator to ceate general power of
appointments in regard to all or any of
his estate; thus leaving the ultimate
destination of the same solely and exclusively in the discretion of another.
The result of such a course will be,
that the appointee will have his whole
life in which to make the appointment,
failing of which, the property will go
to those entitled to the residue; or as in
case of intestacy, as the case may be.
This point is considerably discussed in
the case of Gibbs vs. Rumsey, 2 Vesey
& B. 294. The principle of this last
case seems to be that where the gift
implies no object at all, but merely that
the donee shall dispose of it, the gift is
treated as absolute in such donee, at
least during life, with the power to
dispose of it at his own absolute discretion, at any time during his life. In a
very late English case, Fenton vs. Hawkins, 9 Weekly Reporter 300, where
the devise was to three persons, as
tenants in common, subject to any disposition the testator might thereaftermake, by deed or writing dulyexecuted,
and none being made, it was held the
donees took an absolute interest. Redfield on Wills 699.
The result of the English cases seems
to be, that where there'is manifested on
the face of the will a purpose of controlling the action of the donee, in regard to the ultimate disposition of the
estate, the bequest is to be regarded in
the nature of a trust. Wright vs. Atkins, 1 T. & Russ. 143. And in all
cases of trust, by which, in -courts of
equity, is meant, where the appointee
is absolutely reqeired to dispose of the
estate in a particular manner, either
directed in the will Qr by the courts;
the mode bf such disposition must be
so described in the will, that courts
may be able to enforce it, 'and for that

purpose to determine when the trustee
has or has not discharged his duty.
But in all cases of appointment, where
the first donee is left to his own absolute will and desire, although it may be
fair to presume the testator expected
such donee to make some disposition of
the estate and not absolutely to retain
it himself; still if no limitation is prescribed in the will, the English courts
have in some well considered cases held,
that the donee has his whole life in
which to make such disposition, and
that any application during his life, on
the part of the heir or next of kin, to
the courts, to compel such appointment,
will be premature, inasmuch as the
donee has by the terms of the gift an
unlimited time in which to make his appointment, and no court can say he is in
default during his life.' See opinion of
Court in Gibbs vs. Rumsey, supra. And
from the case of Fenton vs. Hawkins,
supra, it would seem questionable how
far the heirs or next of kin could interfere and interpose any valid claim,
even after the decease of the donee,
with the power of appointment unexecuted. But that question seems not
settled.
But, as is well said by the learned
judge in the principal case, there
must be some present purpose expressed in the will to make the final disposition of the estate, or to clothe the donees "with the power to do so," or the
provision is wholly inoperative in any
view. And viewed as a trust merely,
in contradistinction to a power of appointment, the provisions of the will"
must be certain, or else, in the language
of the courts, susceptible of being reduced to certainty. By this is commonly understood, that in all trusts,
both the subject of the gift and the object, or beneficiaries, must be so described, that they are capable of being
ascertained by the court. This is a
nice and very difficult question, which
we have no time or space here to discuss.
I. F. R.
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In the -Louisville Chancery Court, Kentucky.
F.

F.

LUCAS VS.

E.

M. BRUCE et al.

1. The doctrine of belligerent rights gives no power to the enemy to take with
impunity the property of a citizen of an invaded country.
2. The rebel army during their occupation of a portion of the United States
are mere trespassers.
3. Therefore the order of a commander of such army, is no defence to a party
in an action for taking a third person's goods.
4. Such commander and the person taking in obedience to his orders are joint
trespassers.
5. The compulsion that will excuse a trespass must have been an actual force
upon the person, and must have continued all the time.
6. The statement in plaintiff's declaration, that he was about to use his property for an unlawful and treasonable purpose, is not a defence in an action
against defendant for taking such property and applying it to the samne purpose.
7. Where property is taken by a trespasser, and while in his possession is
destroyed, under such circumstances that it is a matter of doubt whether it would
have been destroyed had it remained in the possession of the rightful owner, the
trespasser is liable for the full value.
8. A party is liable for a tort committed by his copartner in connection with
the general object of the firm.
9. The Louisville Chancery Court has jurisdiction of torts, but the amount of
damages must be settled by a jury.

Bullock

Anderson and Eon. Joseph B. Underwood, for

plaintiff.

C. A. and I. Caldwell, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered, September 9, 1864, by
PIRTLE, Chancellor.-The plaintiff, in December 1861, was the
owner of a pork-packing establishment in the county of Warren,
Kentucky; and he was engaged at that time in curing and packing beef and pork, or just beginning such business for the season.
Before this a portion of the rebel army had taken possession of
the city of Bowling Green, and were in the military occupation,
if not of the whole, of the principal part of the county of Warren. E. M. Bruce & Co., who were not residents of Warren
county, but of a different part of the state, came to Bowling
Green soon after the rebel army, and proposing to do business in
the firm name, E. M. Bruce applied to the plaintiff to rent his
establishment for a certain sum, but the plaintiff rejected his
offer. He then applied to one W. J. Hardee, who professed to
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be a major-general commanding the rebel forces then in that
county, and procured from him a written order addressed to the
plaintiff requiring him to rent the property aforesaid to the firm
of E. M. Bruce & Co., and upon his failure to do so, a forcible
possession was given them by the military under the order of said
Hardee, that they might prepare pork and beef for this rebel
army. And, to serve the said rebel forces, they went on and did
so furnish pork and beef accordingly, until the 14th of February,
1862, when on the approach of General 0. M. Mitchell, with a
division of the army of the United States, Hardee, with the rebel
army, fled in confusion; but in the instant of their flight, and
while Mitchell's guns were booming across the Barren River,
Hardee ordered the pork establishment of the plaintiff to be destroyed by fire, with a large quantity of pork which the said. firm
of E. M. Bruce & Co. had placed therein, so that the pork might
not fall into the hands of the Union army.
This suit is brought to recover the value of the pork-packing
establishment at the time of the burning, as well as the rents
from the time of the forcible possession, and damages for the displacing of the plaintiff in his business. If this Court of Chancery
has any jurisdiction over this matter of tort, it is, of course, by
virtue of the statutes of this state. No doubt the statutes do
extend to cases of tort, and the court may take jurisdiction, and
attach property where the parties cannot be served with the process of a common law court. But I shall not now decide finally
the question of jurisdiction in this case, as to the representatives
of Armstrong, one of the firm of E. M. Bruce & Co., who has
since departed this life.
It is presented as one of the grounds of defence in this case,
that Hardee's army of rebels had control of the county of Warren, and had established a de facto power excluding the authority
de jure of Kentucky and of the United States, and that this de
facto power was part of a government erected by eleven states,
and supported by large armies and navies at the time of the order
given by said W. J. Hardee, Major-General, to put the said firm
in possession, to work for the benefit of said rebel forces. There
is'no doubt if persons are compelled by a power not to be resisted,
and which is immediately applied, they will be excused for what
would otherwise be a trespass on their part. But this force must
be upon the person, and it must be an actual compulsion that
cannot be resisted, and have continued all the time. They must
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have joined "cprotimore mortie et recesseruntquam cito potuerunt:"
4 Blackstone 80; Foster 14, 216. But here was really no force
except as against the plaintiff, and this seems to have been
invited by the firm of E. M. Bruce & Co. They were not forced,
but had the plaintiff forced to give up his property to them.
But it is said that this possession was taken, and this burning
of the establishment of the plaintiff was done by orders of the
commanding officer of this Southern de facto government, and
that the defendants must be excused. Had this officer the right
to make such an order; or was he, himself, only a wrongdoer
and a trespasser ? He was an officer of a body of men calling
themselves a government; but not acknowledged to be such by
any government in the world. They were a band of rebels and
marauders, engaged then in the most unjustifiable attack on
Kentucky-who had not molested them-only equalled by the
barbarous invasion of Holland by Louis XIV. They had no
authority themselves, and therefore had none to bestow on any
officer to take the possession, and burn the property of a Kentuckian under such a plea as the necessity of war. Indeed, no
invader can have such a right, except in the relation he holds to
his own government and his responsibility there; no further, and
nowhere else. We have heard a good deal said lately about belligerent rights, both out of the courts and in the courts, and we
are a little apt to misapply these words. The expression cc belligerent rights," his hardly ever, as used by our writers on the
law of war, or international law, any rdference to the rights
between an individual and the forces of either party in the war.
The expression generally applies to the two governments at war,
and to the other governments of the world which are affected
thereby. A policy, founded on benevolence and humanity, compels us when hostilities have become strong, and assumed ,right
form of war," to call even those engaged in rebellion and -insurrection by the softer name of belligerents, and treat them as
having belligerent rights, meaning that they may, from humane
necessity, stand in some respects as independent nations carrying
on war. Thus this rule makes what would have been a right to punish
immediately for treason or piracy, only a right to hold a party as
a prisoner of war. A pirate is hosti8 humani generis, an enemy
of the human race, and all nations are called on to go in pursuit
of a pirate ship, whether she is operating on the commerce of one
nation or all nations, and when her crew are taken, their punishVOL. XII.-7
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ment is death by the law of nations. The Alabama, lately sunk
by the Kearsarge near the coast of France, would have come
within the general law against pirates, but for this necessary
humane policy that so extends itself that individuals are treated.
as public enemies, and not as private criminals. These are some
instances of things that come within the meaning of this expression. The Alabama could not, however, according to the laws
and courtesy of Christian nations, have received any assistance
or countenance in her piratical course; and if ever such was done
by any nation, it was an offence to all others.
But the dpctrine of belligerent rights gives no power to the
enemy to take with impunity the property of a citizen or subject
of an invaded country; and no sovereign power even acknowledged by all the world, can give such authority. When Sir
William Howe burned the houses of Whigs in Philadelphia, in
1777, he could not have set up in defence the command of his
king, or the necessity of war-the very fact of the necessity of
war would have made the justification less. If he had come
within the reach of a sheriff of Pennsylvania, his plea would have
been nothing; and it may be that his master in like predicament
would have fared no better.
- In 1780, an officer under the orders of Lord Cornwallis,
or Lord Rawdon, took from a farmer in South Carolina, negroes,
horses, cattle, hogs, &c., and according to military orders had
them taken to the British garrison at Camden. He was sued in
1784, and pleaded the orders of his superiors, and that no part
of the property was appropriated to his own use; but the court
said that his superiors and himself were equally guilty of a trespass: Whitaker vs. English, 1 Bay's Rep. 14.
Our own generals in a campaign are not allowed to take or to
destroy private property, except from absolute necessity; and if
they do so; they are liable to the private action of the party
whose property has -been taken or has been destroyed. On this
subject see the case of Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 Howard's
Supreme Court Rep. 115. Where this full necessity exists they
will not be trespassers, and the party suffering must look to the
government; but if it does not exist they will be trespassers, as
will be all who act under their orders, uinless there is personal
coercion. This case, taking the argument of counsel as well as
the court, is the fullest we have in America on this subject. On
the general subject of the destruction of property, from neces-
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sity, and for the public good, see Russell vs. Mayor, &c., of New
York, 2 Denio 461. There is not much kindred to any facts in
this case, but the positions are interesting.
But, to repeat, whoever heard that a nation in time of war
and unjust invasion, was bound to sanction or abide by the orders
of the generals of the enemy, to appropriate to himself the property of her citizens, or to destroy it, and that rights of property
could be taken away by the orders of a foe ?
There is no element of which laws are made that can afford such
a sanction, or that can combine with any principle to make such
a rule.
Hardee was a wrongdoer, and they who went into this porkpacking establishment under his order, were trespassers jointly
with hirm.
But it is contended, that Armstrong was not liable, because it
is not shown that he had any knowledge of the trespass, and, of
course, did not sanction it. These persons composing the firm
of E. M. Bruce & Co. evidently went into the rebel lines for the
purpose of making money by affording supplies, such as pork,
&c., for the rebel army. The firm was of three men,; one was at
Nashville, another at Clarksville in Tennessee, and the other,
E. M. Bruce, was at Bowling Green in Kentucky. Armstrong,
who was at Nashville, must naturally have known that Bruce was
conducting their business at Bowling Green; and it is about as
natural that he shbuld have known that he had superseded the
plaintiff in the business, and how he got the use of plaintiff's
establishment. But whether he had actual knowledge of the
trespass or not, it seems to me that he was responsible. These
persons left their homes in a distant part of the state to unite
themselves, in some sense, with this body of violence-this rebel
army-in the business they were to do; and a tort committed by
one of them, such as this was, in connection with their. object,
should bind the other members of the firm: Story on Partnership, §§ 166, 167, 168; Parsons on Contracts, Vol. 1, page 161,
and notes.
The plaintiff says in his petition, he was ready to go on with
the same porl-packing business at the establishment, and at the
time of .the trespass complained of. This is a confession that he
was about to devote, or had devoted, the" establishment to an
unlawful and treasonable purpose; for there was no other to
whom he could have sold his pork but this enemy. But it does
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not lie in the mouth of E. Af. Bruce & Co. to say, that they were
justified in the taking of the property by violence, in order that
they might supply the same enemy. His conduct would have
been for the judgment of his government, and was nothing to the
defendants one way or the other.
The principal damages sought to be recovered are for the burnIr ing of the house, fixtures, tools, &c., and it is contended in defence,
that the damages are too remote, &c. It is true that the destruction of this property did not necessarily result from the violent
possession taken of it by E. M. Bruce & Co. If the plaintiff had
remained in possession of this property, and had carried on the
same business, and for the same object and purpose, the supply
of the enemy, there might have been pork in the house when
General Mitchell's troops came up, and a burning might have
taken place by the order of Hardee, for the same cause that the
order was in fact made. But we do not know how the plaintiff
would have employed or managed his property at the crisis;
whether he would have had a large quantity of pork there or not,
so a to invite the burning, or what pains he might have taken,
successfully, to save. his house, &c. The most, then, we can say,
is that it might or might not have been burned, if it had, not been
taken from him. I think, as a general rule, that in such cases,
where such a problem is made by the wrongdoer, the potential
fact is to be resolved against him.
This is not really a case of remote and speculative damages,
but the question is, whether the fact creating the damages is connected in any form with the wrong of the party, or not. If a
trespasser has taken possession of another man's house, and, on
account of some spite which a mob may have against him, the
house is injured or destroyed, it seems to me there is such a connection between the two acts, that the trespasser would be held
liable for the damage done to the house; for, but for his unlawful possession, the harm would not have happened. This case has
strong analogy, though the motive was not spite. The motive
does not govern. The case of the Balloon in New York illustrates
this doctrine very well. Guille went up in a balloon, and accidentally came do*n in Swan's Garden, and the crowd of people,
out of curiosity, and to help him in his difficulty with the balloon,
rushed into the garden, and tramped down much that was growing there, and the court held Guille responsible for the damages
done by the crowd: 19 Johnston's Rep. 382. It is not necessary
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in these cases to show, as inanother class, that the damages are
the proximate and direct result of the wrongful act; there is
connection enough without that. In the case of King vs. Shanks,
12 Ben. Monroe 415, the doctrine of the responsibility of the
wrongdoer for what may happen, not as the direct effect of his
wrong, is discussed much at large, and the authorities generally
cited. In this case the court .makes these very practical remarks;
we shall find them useful: -It may be. impossible to express in
general terms the precise relation which should exist between an
illegal act and the ensuing damage, in order to throw the responsibility on the wrongdoer." See also the case of Jtunford vs.
Taylor, 2 Metcalfe Ky. Rep. 599. The principle that holds
bailees liable for casualties to the property which they wrongfully
hold after the bailment is terminated, might be applied to this
case, and we all know this rule as to bailees.
But let us not forget that these doctrines are not absolutely
necessary to be considered in this case. Hardee was a joint
trespasser with this firm all the time the place was occupied by
them, and thoy were joint trespassers with him at the time of the
burning of the property, as part of the original and continued
trespass, and were responsible as much for the damage then
done by his order as for the original entry on the premises.
Hardec, when he was about to burn the house, &c., and because
he was going to do so, gave to the plaintiff an order for ten
thousand pounds of pork, part of which he got out before every'thing was destroyed. This cannot be considered a satisfaction,
but it should be taken in mitigation of damages.
The constitution of this state maintains the ancient mode of
trial by jqry; and although the General Assembly may change
the forum in cases of tort, as in this case, the Court of Chancery
may have jurisdiction certainly over the property of some of the
parties, yet in this court, as well as in the court of law, a jury
must be impannelled to find the amount of damages ; for this
right cannot be taken away by the legislature.
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In the New York Court of Appeals.
JOHN C. SM1ITH VS. WILLIAM COUNTRYMAN.

A. made an executory contract for the sale of goods to B. In an action
brought by the vendee (B.) against the vendor (A.) to recover damages for the
non-performance of the. contract, A. established by way of defence, that B.
falsely and with fraudulent intent, and as an inducement for A. to enter into the
contract, represented that he had purchased goods of like quality, at the same
price, of one C., a person -who was acquainted with their value, and in whose
judgment A. placed confidence. He also showed that he sold the goods to B. at
a stipulated price, relying upon the false statement. Eeld, on this state of facts,
that the plaintiff could not recover.
The vendor under such circumstances had a right to. rely upon the vendee's
statements without making inquiry of C. as to their truth.
The false statement was material to the contract. The rule laid down by Mr.
Parsons, in his work on Contracts, approved: "If the fraud be such that, had it
not been practised, the contract would not have been made, or the transaction
completed, then it is material to it."
It is immaterial in such a case that the vendee agreed to pay the market price
on the day of sale. If the contract was induced by fraud, the fraud is a com-,
plete defence to an action brought to recover damages for a failure to fulfil the
executory contract.
The practice of raising questions of law at The circuit by a motion to strike
out the defendant's answer, disapproved as contrary to the New York Code.
The question should be presented either by a proper motion before the trial or
by demurrer.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
DAVIES, J.-This action is to recover damages for the breach
of a contract t6 deliver a quantity of hops. The defendant
agreed in writing with one H. R. Wood, to sell and deliver to

him at the railroad depot at Fort Plain, all his crop of hops for
the year 1860, put up in bales and delivered in good merchantable order, on the 20th of October in that year.

'Wood was to

receive and pay for the hops 12 cents per pound. The defendant's crop that year amounted to 8409 pounds. Wood was ready
and willing to receive and pay for them, at the time and place
The defendant neglected or refused to deliver
agreed upon.
them. Such hops were proved to have been worth, at the time
they were to be delivered, 30 cents a pound, and the difference
between the contract price agreed to be paid for them and the

value at the time and place of delivery was $596.57, which
the plaintiff claimed as damages for the breach of the contract.
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The contract had been assigned to the plaintiff. The defendant
set up by way of defence, in his second answer, that at the time
of making the contract he was ignorant of the price of hops and
reluctant to make the agreement. That Wood represented to
him, that he, Wood, had purchased the crop of one Henry
Elwood, a large and experienced hop-grower, at twelve and onehalf cents per pound, and that he, the defendant, believing such
statement, and having faith and confidence in the sagacity, prudence, and judgment of Elwood, entered into such agreement.
He then alleges that the statement 5f Wood, that he had purchased Elwood's hops, was false and fraudulent, was made to
deceive and defraud the defendant, and that by such false and
fraudulent representations, he, the defendant, was actually deceived and induced to enter into such agreement, which was very
disadvantageous, as hops were then worth more than twelve and
one-half cents per pound, and that immeditely thereafter, there
was a great rise in the price of hops. On the trial the agreement was proved; the price of hops at the time the delivery was
to be made by the terms of the agreement, was 28 to 30- cents
per pound. The agreement bore date August 14th; the price
of hops on that day was shown to be from 12 to 12 cents per
pound. Upon this proof the plaintiff rested his -ase, and the
defendant moved for a nonsuit, which was denied by the court,
and the defendant's counsel excepted. The plaintiff then moved
to strike out the second ground of defence above stated, for the
reasons, that the facts therein did not constitute a fraud, and
that if the representations were made as set forth in the answer,
they were immaterial and constituted no defence to the action.
The court denied the motion, and the plaintiff excepted, The
defendant was then permitted to prove, and did prove, the facts
as set forth in the answer, except the averment therein, that at
the time of the execution of the agreement, hops were worth
more than twelve and a half cents per pound, by himself and
two other witnesses named Miller and rankhite ; and it also
appeared from their testimony that, at the time of the negotiation, Wood showed the defendant his book, wherein he had entered several contracts made by him with hop-growers for their
crops at twelve and one-half cents per pound. That Elwood's
name was not on the book among those with whom contracts had
been made. Wood was algo sworn, and testified that he told defendant he expected to purchase Elwood's crop of hops, and it
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was admitted on the trial that Wood had not purchased any hops
of Elwood. The plaintiff moved to strike out the evidence given
by the defendant and Miller and Crankhite, so far as the same
relates to the representations made by Wood of .the purchase of
Elwood's hops, as being immaterial and constituting no defence
to the action, which motion was denied and the plaintiff excepted.
The defendant had testified that he said to Wood, that ifwhat
he, Wood, had said was so, in regard to Elwood's hops, he would
enter into the contract with him. The defendant then added,
g4I did, believe the representations made that he had purchased
Elwood's hops." This answer was objected to by the plaintiff's
counsel, as improper and immaterial, -but the objection was overruled, and the plaintiff's counsel excepted. The defendant then
testified without objection, that he entered into the contract relying on that representation, and that soon afterwards he ascertained its falsity.
The jury, found a verdict for the defendant, and judgment
thereon was affirmed at the General Term.
The three exceptions taken by the plaintiff on the trial to the
rulings of the court, present the only questions arising for the
consideration of this court, upon this appeal.
If the new matter set up by the defendant, as constituting a
defence, were sham or irrelevant, it was the duty of the plaintiff
to have moved on notice to strike it out. Code, § 152. If the
new matter did not upon its face constitute a defence, it was the
duty of the plaintiff to have demurred to it. Code, § 153. The
practice resorted to in this case, to correct the pleadings by motion at the trial, is not warranted by the Code, and should not be
encouraged. The plaintiff in substance, by his motion to strike
out the second ground of defence, admitted the allegations of the
answer, and the question was presented to the court in the same
form as if he had demurred to the answer. A moment's consideration will show how dangerous and inconvenient it is to reserve
questions of law for argument and decision at the Circuit. But
assuming the question was properly raised there, then it is to be
considered whether the new matter set up in the answer upon its
face constituted a defence to the action. And the question to be
decided is in substance the same, whether it is put on the motion
to strike out that defence or upon the motion to strike out the
testimony which was given to establish it. In the first place, it
is to be borne in mind that the plaintiff in this action is seeking
-
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to enforce an executory contract, made and entered into by the
defendant, as conceded by him, upon false and fraudulent repre.
sentations made by the plaintiff's assignor, to induce him to make
the same, and upon which it was admitted he, the defendant,
relied. The statement of the proposition would seem sufficient
to suggest the answer which the law should make. In the aspect
we are now regarding the case, we are to take the statements of
the defendant's answer as true. They are that he was ignorant
of the price of hops, and was reluctant to make the agreement
with Wood, the plaintiff's assignor: that Wood, to induce the
defendant to sell him his hops and enter into the agreement,
represented that he had purchased the hops of one Elwood, a
large and experienced hop-grower, for the price of 12J cents per
pound; and that relying upon such representation, and believing
the truth thereof, and having confidence in the prudence and
judgment of Elwood, the defendant entered into the agreement.
That hops were at that time worth more than 12J cents per'
pound; that such representations were false and fraudulent, and
made with the intent to deceive and defraud the defendant. It
is now urged that it was the folly of the defendant that he relied
upon these representations; that it was his duty to have made
inquiry of Elwood to have ascertained the truth of the representations before he entered into the contract. In other words,
the defendant should have assumed that Wood's statements, if
not untrue, were at least doubtful, and that he is to suffer for
giving them credence, while the party knowingly making the
false representation, is to reap the fruits of his fraud, because.
the party dealing with him did not distrust him. It was well
observed by the court in 'Van Epps vs. ITarrison, 5 Hill 63, that
the credulity of the defendant furnishes but a poor excuse for
thd falsehood and fraud of the plaintiff, and the latter will have
no just ground of complaint if he is held responsible for. his misconduct. That was an action upon a bond given upon a sale of
land by the plaintiff to the defendant, and, as a defepce to the
action, the defendant set up that the plaintiff falsely and fraudu.lently represented to him that he had just purchased and paid
$32,000 for the land, when in truth he had paid ut $16,000 ;
and the court were of the opinion that the false affirmation concerning the price paid for the land furnished a good defence to
the action.
L It is true, as contended by the counsel for the appellant, that

SMITH vs. COUNTRYMAN.

the fraud which will vitiate a contract must be material, and that
it must'relate distinctly and directly to the contract, and must
affect its very essence and substance. Parsons, in his work on
Contracts (2 Parsons 267), observes that there is no positive
standard by which to deterniine whether the fraud be thus material or not, but that no better rule for deciding the question can
be given than this : - If the fraud be such that had it not been
practised, the contract would not have been made, or the transaction completed, then it is material to it." Applying this rule
to the case at bar, in the aspect we are now considering it, the
materiality of the representation is placed beyond all question.
The defendant says, that being ignorant himself of the value of
hops, and knowing the -prudence and judgment of Elwood, he,
in reliance on the representation that Elood had sold his hops
to Wood at the price named, entered into the contract to sell his
hops to him at the same price.' Whatever state of facts would
enable a party to avoid a contract, is equally available to enable
him to defeat one sought to be enforced against him. Could this
defendant therefore have sought the aid of a court of equity
upon the facts stated in his answer, to set aside this contract?
The authorities are abundant to show that he could. In -Dagge'tt
vs. Emerson, 3 Story Rep. 733, Mr. Justice STORY states the
principles by which courts of equity are to be governed in such
cases, in the following elegant and forcible terms, and these observations have peculiar force and significance as applicable to
the present case. He says, "It is equally promotive of sound
morals, fair dealings, and public justice and policy, that' every
vendor should distinctly comprehend not only that good faith
should reign over all his conduct in relation to the sale, but that
there should be the most scrupulous good faith, an exalted
honesty, or, as it is often felicitously expressed, uberrimafides,
in bvery representation made by him, as an inducement to the
sale. He should literally in his representations tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. If his representation is false in any one substantial circumstance going to the
inducement or essence of the bargain, and the vendee is thereby
misled, the sale is voidable, and it is usually immaterial whether
the representation be wilfully and designedly false or ignorantly
and negligently untrue. The vendor acts at his peril, and is
bound by every syllable he utters, or proclaims, or knowingly
impresses upon the vendee, as a lure or decisive motive for the
bargain."
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In Taylor vs. Fleet, 1 Barb. - 471, the vendee sought the aid
of a court of equity to set aside a conveyance and sale of real
estate, on the ground that the vendor had made a representation
in regard to the land which was untrue, and the court held that
the vendee having ascertained that the representation was untrue,
had the right to' rescind the contract. That whatever may have
been the motive of the vendor in making an erroneous representation respecting the land about to be sold by -him, it is
enough to entitle the purchaser to relief that there was a misrepresentation of a matter of fact material to the subject of negotiation, and which constituted the very basis of the contract.
The court said, " The representation being untrue and influential,
vitiated the transaction, whether such representation was wilfully
and designedly false or ignorantly or negligently untrue." See
also opinion of Mr. Justice WOODBURY, 9 Law Reporter 160,
Warner vs. Daniels; Story's Eq. Juris. § 192, 193; -Hugh vs.
Richardson, 3 Story Rep.- 659; Bennett vs. Judson, 21 N. Y.
238. In Neville vs. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. Ch. Rep. 546, Lord
Chancellor THURLOw said: -It has been said here is no evidence of actual fraud in R., but only a combination 'to defraud
him. A court of justice would make itself ridiculous if it permitted such a distinction. Misrepresentation of circumstances is
admitted, and there is positively a deception." And he added:
"If a man upon a treaty for any contract, will make a false
representation by means of which he puts the party bargaining
under a mistake upon the terms of the bargain, it is a fraud.
It misleads the party contracting on the subject of the contract."
In harmony with the doctrine of these cases are the principles
laid down by this court in F'alton vs. National Fund Life Ins.
Co., 20 N. Y. R. 82. It was there decided that fraudulent representations made by the assured to the insurer, up6n his application for a policy, though not material to the risk, yet material in
the judgment of the insurer, and which induced him to take the
risk, would avoid the policy: And this court held that a misrepresentation, although it did not affect the nature of the risk,
yet was a fraud because it induced a confidence without which
the party would not have acted. This principle covers the whole
ground in controversyr in the present actiofi, and if -pplicable to
the present case is decisive of it. But it is urged by the appellant's counsel, that the law of contracts of insurance and contracts of sale are different and rest on different principles. That
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the parties do not deal in the former case on the presumption of
equal knowledge and vigilance as to the subject-matter of the
contract, and that hence a different rule of law prevails. It is
true that in contracts of insurance, all representations material
to the risk, if untrue, avoid the policy, but representations not
material rest on the ground of fraud, and therefore vitiate the
policy on that ground. This distinction was urged upon the
court in the case of Moens vs. Heyworth, 10 Meeson & Welsby
147. In that case the question was whether a contract for the
sale of coffee, which was represented to be invoiced to the sellers,
was void from the fact that such reRresentations were untrue,
and it was held that it was. Lord ABINGER, Chief Baron, said:
" The fraud which vitiates a contract and gives the party a right
to recover, does not in all cases necessarily imply moral turpitude. There may be a misrepresentation as to the facts stated
in the contract, all the circumstances to which the party may
believe to be true. In policies of insurance, for instance, if an
insurer makes a misrepresentation, it vitiates the contract. Such
contracts it is true are of a peculiar nature, and have relation s
well to the rights of the parties as to the event. In the case of
a contract for the sale of a public-house, if the seller represent
by mistake that the house realized more than in fact it did, he
would be defrauding the purchaser and deceiving him, but that
might arise from his not having kept proper books or from nonattention to his affairs; yet as soon as the other party discovers
it, an action may be maintained for the loss consequent upon
such misrepresentation, inasmuch as he was thereby induced to
give more than the house was worth. And he further observed,
that the question of fact, whether there was fraud or not, ought
to be decided by the jury from the circumstances of the case.
PARKE, Baron, remarked: The case of a policy of insurance
does not appear to me to be analogous to the present; those
instruments are made upon an implied contract between the parties, that everything material known to the assured should be
disclosed by them. This is the basis on which the contract proceeds, and it is material to see that it is not obtained by means of
untrue representation or concealment in any respect. In this
case, he says, the plaintiffs must prove a representation by words
or acts of that as trde which was known to the defendants to be
untrue, as in the cases of Polhill vs. Walter, 3 B. & Adol. 114,
and Foster 'vs. Charles, 6 Bing. 696. In .the former case Lord
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TENTERDEN laid down the rule, that it is not necessary to prove

that the false representation was made from a corrupt motive of
gain to the party making it, or a wicked motive of injury to the
other party. It was enough if a representation is made, which
the party making it knows to be untrue, and which is intended
by him, or which, from the mode in which it is made, is calculated
to induce another to act on the faith of it, in such a way that he
may incur damage, and that damage is actually incurred. In
Poster vs. Charles the same doctrine is reiterated, and PARKE, J.,
quotes with approbation the remark of CHAMBRE, J., in Tapp vs.
Lee, 3 Bos. & P. 871, that it would be an absurdity in law to
hold that if a man draws another into a snare, the party suffering should have no remedy by action. It is perfectly clear,
therefore, from principle and authority, that if the plaintiff had
demurred to the second ground of defence contained in the defendant's answer, as not sufficient in law, the demurrer would
have been overruled and judgment given for the defendant. -The
judge therefore properly refused to strike out the second ground
of defence as stated in the answer. He also properly refused to
strike out the testimony which the defendant had adduced to sustain that answer, except the allegation that hops were, at the
time the defendant made the contract, woith more than twelve
and one-half cents per pound. Such fact had no materiality in
excusing the plaintiff's assignor from the fraud practised upon
the defendant. Nrn constat that the defendant would not have entered into the contract if he had known that circumstance. The
question here is, whether a contract obtained from a person by
fraud and falsehood can be enforced against him by the party
procuring it. I think clearly it cannot. It is undeniable that
if it could have been enforced, or if the defendant had fulfilled
it, he would sustain thereby great damage, and it is no answer
for the plaintiff to say that the defendant might on that day have
sold his hops either to Wood or some one else for the same price
if the fraud had not been practised. The defendant was at
liberty to refuse to fulfil the contract on his part as soon as he
ascertained the fraud practised upon him, and the law will not
subject him to the damages which the plaintiff or his essignee
may have sustained from their inability to realize the fruits of
their fraudulent acts. The motion to strike out the defendant's
testimony was therefore properly denied.
The evidence of the belief of the defendant in the represents.

